Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Buch | Kapitel

189035

Introduction

Jacek Paśniczek

pp. 1-6

Abstrakt

The notion of intentional object, or object of consciousness, remains notoriously ambiguous despite extensive contemporary studies devoted to the topic of intentionality. On the one hand, the intentional object can be conceived of as a real object to which an act of consciousness is directed. When I see a black cat it is just this cat that is the intentional object of my act of seeing. On the other hand, however, intentional objects can be mere objects of thought, dream, imagination, desire, etc. When I am thinking about (dreaming, imagining,...) the monster of Loch Ness, a golden mountain, Sherlock Holmes, the seven dwarfs, these objects of my thought do not exist in the usual sense of the word.

Publication details

Published in:

Paśniczek Jacek (1998) The logic of intentional objects: a Meinongian version of classical logic. Dordrecht, Springer.

Seiten: 1-6

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-8996-3_1

Referenz:

Paśniczek Jacek (1998) Introduction, In: The logic of intentional objects, Dordrecht, Springer, 1–6.