Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Buch | Kapitel

193398

On the epistemological foundations of cognitive science

Jeff Coulter

pp. 5-42

Abstrakt

[T]he problem is that a unique abstract characterization of man’s cognitive functioning does not exist. … The fact that it is not possible to uniquely determine cognitive structures and processes poses a clear limitation on our ability to understand the nature of human intelligence. I once thought it could mean unique identification of the structures and processes underlying cognitive behavior. Since that is not possible, I propose that we take ‘understanding the nature of human intelligence’ to mean possession of a theory that will enable us to improve human intelligence.1

Publication details

Published in:

Coulter Jeff (1983) Rethinking cognitive theory. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

Seiten: 5-42

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-06706-0_2

Referenz:

Coulter Jeff (1983) On the epistemological foundations of cognitive science, In: Rethinking cognitive theory, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 5–42.