So far we have been considering Deleuze's version of Spinoza's monism, where the One is divided into two: Natura naturans and Natura naturata¹ and I have suggested that we should be unhappy about his account of the relationship. He is, I have argued, unable to convince us that finite modes can or do "follow from" the infinite. For this and other reasons the ontological status of these finite modes remains thoroughly questionable. Now Hegel argued the same point against Spinoza. His concern for the individual mode was a response to his belief that Spinoza was also unable to explain the "follow from" relationship. Unsurprisingly Hegel attributed this failure to the lack of interaction between Thought and Extension, which for him is the only convincing explanation of individual determination. Without wishing to agree prematurely to this explanation, I do concede that I believe the outcome to be the same in Deleuze's work as it is in Spinoza's. There is, indeed, a blotting out of the principle of individuality, of subjectivity.