As I have reconstructed it, I think the transcendental analysis of experimental activity is sound. In this chapter I would like to bring the results of the previous chapter to bear on Kant's conception of natural necessity, arguing that Bhaskar's analysis can not only be defended against Kantian counter-objections but that it also entails a decisive critique of transcendental idealism and provides a superior conception of natural necessity. In Section 5.1 I noted that Kant's conception of natural necessity is formed within a problem-context largely determined by Hume's skeptical problematization of causal judgments, and one of the upshots of Bhaskar's analysis is that if the conditions of the intelligibility of experimental activity are adequately analyzed in the first place that problem-context need never arise. In this chapter I will develop and attempt to secure some similar and interrelated consequences of that analysis, namely, that if the aforementioned conditions are adequately analyzed, then: 1) the basis of natural necessity should be attributed to transcendentally real tendencies rather than a transcendentally ideal category; and so 2) the ontological category consisting of such tendencies should replace Kant's non-ontological category of causality; 3) the ontological structure of a trans-human — that is, including but overreaching the human — nature, rather than a subjective facultative apparatus, is a transcendental condition of scientific knowledge; and 4) experience is for the most part cognitively significant to the extent that it allows natural science to transcend sense experience.