Allais's paradox
pp. 357-360
Abstrakt
Introspection about certain hypothetical decision situations suggests that the sure-thing principle and, with it, the theory of utility are normatively unsatisfactory. Consider an example based on two decision situations each involving two gambles.
Publication details
Published in:
Arló-Costa Horacio, Hendricks Vincent F., van Benthem Johan (2016) Readings in formal epistemology: sourcebook. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 357-360
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_19
Referenz:
Savage Leonard (2016) „Allais's paradox“, In: H. Arló-costa, V. F. Hendricks & J. Van Benthem (eds.), Readings in formal epistemology, Dordrecht, Springer, 357–360.