Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Buch | Kapitel

210654

Brain and free will

John C. Eccles

pp. 101-121

Abstrakt

That we have free will is a fact of experience. Furthermore, I state emphatically that to deny free will is neither a rational nor a logical act. This denial either presupposes free will for the deliberately chosen response in making that denial, which is a contradiction, or else it is merely the automatic response of a nervous system built by genetic coding and molded by conditioning. One does not conduct a rational argument with a being who makes the claim that all its responses are reflexes, no matter how complex and subtle the conditioning. For example, one should not argue with a Skinnerian, and moreover a Skinnerian should not engage in argument. Discourse becomes degraded into an exercise that is no more than conditioning and counter-conditioning—what we may characterize as Skinnerian games!

Publication details

Published in:

Globus Gordon G., Maxwell Grover, Savodnik Irwin (1976) Consciousness and the brain: a scientific and philosophical inquiry. Dordrecht, Springer.

Seiten: 101-121

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4684-2196-5_4

Referenz:

Eccles John C. (1976) „Brain and free will“, In: G. G. Globus, G. Maxwell & I. Savodnik (eds.), Consciousness and the brain, Dordrecht, Springer, 101–121.