Buch | Kapitel
Reductionism, levels of organization, and the mind-body problem
pp. 205-267
Abstrakt
Dr. Sperry's position is complex and variegated, and I will be unable to discuss some of the issues raised by him in this volume and in other closely related papers. He has chosen to characterize his position generally as "emergent interactionism" and to spend a great deal of time distinguishing it from other views, ranging over the spectrum from dualism to materialism. His more general conception justifies and merits a more general response, which I shall present here.
Publication details
Published in:
Globus Gordon G., Maxwell Grover, Savodnik Irwin (1976) Consciousness and the brain: a scientific and philosophical inquiry. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 205-267
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4684-2196-5_9
Referenz:
Wimsatt William C. (1976) „Reductionism, levels of organization, and the mind-body problem“, In: G. G. Globus, G. Maxwell & I. Savodnik (eds.), Consciousness and the brain, Dordrecht, Springer, 205–267.