Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

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211178

Aristotle and reason

Nafsika Athanassoulis

pp. 71-81

Abstrakt

The luck view is rejected not because it has been found to be at odds with scientific fact about the way things are in the universe, discovered by some value-neutral procedure, but because it strikes a false note, i.e. is too much at odds with our other beliefs, and specifically with our evaluative beliefs about what sort of life would be worth living. For we believe that human life is worth the living only if a good life can be secured by effort, and if the relevant sort of effort lies within the capabilities of most people.2

Publication details

Published in:

Athanassoulis Nafsika (2005) Morality, moral luck and responsibility: fortune's web. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

Seiten: 71-81

DOI: 10.1057/9780230508040_5

Referenz:

Athanassoulis Nafsika (2005) Aristotle and reason, In: Morality, moral luck and responsibility, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 71–81.