Premise (I), which claims that rational agency entails freedom, is the most obviously Kantian element in the reconstruction we are now embarking upon. By this I mean not that there is anything distinctively Kantian about arguments purporting to connect rationality with freedom, for that is simply false, but just that, compared with the proposition that freedom entails universality affirmed by Premise (II), Premise (I) does at least approximate to something Kant himself clearly sees as key to his own initial attempt to justify his categorical imperative, as will be evident from our discussion of his "preparatory argument" in  Chapter 2. That said, though, the proposition that rational agents as such are free may seem to be significantly stronger than Kant's own claim that "To every rational being possessed of a will we must lend the Idea of freedom as the only one under which it he can act." (Gr. 448/100–1) This more qualified claim that a rational agent must think of itself as free, or as Kant also puts it (Ibid.), that deliberators really are free from a "practical point of view", reflects the position he had defended in Critique of Pure Reason that we cannot know anything positive about what lies beyond the phenomenal realm presented to our senses, a realm of occurrences which, he had argued in that work, must be entirely predetermined by laws of causation, thus implying that the Idea of freedom is a metaphysical notion that could never strictly be known to apply.