Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Series | Buch | Kapitel

223630

Knowledge and perception

Charles Landesman

pp. 127-154

Abstrakt

In this final chapter, I shall consider color skepticism to be an established view and shall proceed to discuss some of the epistemological questions it raises. Ancient and modern skeptics have frequently pointed out that our senses are deceptive; failures of veridicality occur that lead us to adopt beliefs that are false. Their arguments are occasionally based on pointing out certain examples of deception such as the straight stick that looks bent in water or the round plate that looks elliptical, and so forth. Texts on the psychology of perception are filled with examples of illusions and hallucinations of one kind or another. But such examples fail to support the case that our senses are radically deceptive.

Publication details

Published in:

Landesman Charles (1993) The eye and the mind: reflections on perception and the problem of knowledge. Dordrecht, Springer.

Seiten: 127-154

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-3317-5_8

Referenz:

Landesman Charles (1993) Knowledge and perception, In: The eye and the mind, Dordrecht, Springer, 127–154.