This paper reexamines the foundations of the social sciences through the lens of Husserl’s phenomenology and Bourdieu’s objections to subjectivism. It analyzes Husserl’s conception of the social sciences following Dilthey, and his attempt to ground these sciences in social ontology and transcendental phenomenology. It also shows how Schutz’s phenomenological sociology furthers the convergence between the phenomenological tradition and Weberian interpretive sociology, thereby reinforcing the subjectivist orientation of phenomenology. In contrast, Bourdieu’s praxeology highlights dispositions shaped by objective social structures, challenging the adequacy of interpretive and subjectivist approaches. The paper argues for integrating Bourdieu’s perspective into phenomenology by reconfiguring Husserl’s social ontology to account for transcendent, objective institutions. It identifies three key challenges: distinguishing the transcendental from the insider perspective, addressing Bourdieu’s account of habitus as the product of embodiment, and accessing social reality beyond scientific models. Ultimately, this paper underlines the importance of revising the phenomenological framework of social ontology to engage with later developments in social sciences while preserving the ontological ambition of Husserl’s project.