Chapter V closed as Levinas declared messianic consciousness beyond the scope of the project of TI. The problem of messianism—and therefore also of prophetism—exceeds TI, I believe, because, there, Levinas is still torn between deploying a non-theological metaphysics of responsibility and a hermeneutics of Jewish religious existence in its ethical and theological significance. Messianism, or as Leo Baeck writes, "to be the emissary of God', is left unexamined in TI not because the question is intrinsically unapproachable by a Levinasian phenomenology. To the contrary, I cited Baeck's classical work on Judaism here in order to show that Jewish messianism can and ought to be understood precisely as Levinas' "metaphysical desire' and "responsibility'. The only attitude possible for humans before the commandment, then, is a Baeck-like messianic attitude of expectation and conviction about what Levinas calls "eschatology'. The good will be realized in history, and we are necessary to its realization. We can not, however, explain how the good shall come to pass or why we are indeed a part of it. To believe this, for a Jew, is not so much to believe in the end of history. It is to believe in the contribution, and necessity, of one's fellow humans toward this creation.