Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Buch | Kapitel

190375

The body as expression and speech

Monika Langer

pp. 56-66

Abstrakt

If we examine our pre-reflective lived experience, so Merleau-Ponty has argued, we realize that our body is not a system of externally related parts but rather, that it displays a spontaneous synthesis of powers, a bodily spatiality, a bodily unity, a bodily intentionality, which distinguish it radically from the scientific object posited by traditional schools of thought. In the last chapter Merleau-Ponty described how the apprehension of sexual significance reveals a pre-reflective bodily intentionality such that something begins to exist for us precisely to the extent that the body is a power of transcendence towards it. One might still contend, nonetheless, that this talk of a bodily intentionality is really no more than a metaphor based on a genuine intentionality which is to be found exclusively in the realm of thought. One would insist that after all we should turn our attention to the fact that we are thinking about our lived experience. We will see then, so one might argue, that there is a realm of subjectivity quite distinct from that of our bodily experience, and that this realm of thought, or consciousness, or reflection is the realm of significance and intentionality in their proper sense.

Publication details

Published in:

Langer Monika (1989) Merleau-ponty's phenomenology of perception: a guide and commentary. Dordrecht, Springer.

Seiten: 56-66

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-19761-3_10

Referenz:

Langer Monika (1989) The body as expression and speech, In: Merleau-ponty's phenomenology of perception, Dordrecht, Springer, 56–66.