Buch | Kapitel
Sensing
pp. 72-79
Abstrakt
Empiricism and intellectualism presuppose a ready-made world in their analyses; consequently, both are oblivious to the subject of perception. The empiricist regards perception as merely one event among others occurring in the world, its locus being the perceiver. In studying the sensations which make up this occurrence, the empiricist adopts an impersonal approach — thereby totally neglecting the fact that he lives perception and is the perceiving subject even in his very study of perception itself. This detached approach which relegates perception to the status of a fact in an objective world, fails to recognize that perception is on the contrary the condition of there being any facts for us at all. The empiricist analysis belies that upon which it itself rests — namely, the lived transcendence which creates an opening in being and thereby brings about the presence of a perceptual field. Whereas the empiricist overlooks his own role in his analysis of perception, the intellectualist accords himself a role which makes his lived perception equally incomprehensible while depending upon it just as surely. The empiricist leaves no room for consciousness; the intellectualist subordinates everything to a universal constituting ego.
Publication details
Published in:
Langer Monika (1989) Merleau-ponty's phenomenology of perception: a guide and commentary. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 72-79
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-19761-3_11
Referenz:
Langer Monika (1989) Sensing, In: Merleau-ponty's phenomenology of perception, Dordrecht, Springer, 72–79.