Kohlberg's genetic structuralistic approach to moral development claims to be hermeneutic. According to this approach, one is not interested in explaining moral behavior, but in trying to understand moral judgments and actions from the perspective of a participant. Kohlberg argues that one of his fundamental assumptions is "phenomenalism", the fact that the judgments of his interviewees are meaningful. Just as in hermeneutics, Kohlberg assumes that these judgments are to be understood against the background of some kind of basic understanding ("deep structure"), which can be changed in the face of new experience. Here there is no discrepancy between Kohlberg and hermeneutics. However, H. G. Gadamer, one of hermeneutics' most well-known representatives, has a conception of morality and history as well. This aspect of hermeneutics is relevant for Kohlberg's theory of moral development. It can make clear and correct his often implicit ethical position. In this article I will argue that Kohlberg's presupposed concept of morality neglects the distinction between reasoning and application and that his theory of moral development needs to be enlarged by a additional sequence of moral stages of application. On the other hand, Kohlberg's approach can be used to correct Gadamer's view about the way children reach moral maturity.