Eugen Fink und das Thema des Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit
The speculative direction that Fink in the ’30s had imprinted on phenomenology finds its development – distant in many ways from its theoretical premises in Husserl’s thought – in the first university lectures of the post-war period, among which Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1947) is of peculiar relevance. Some common threads connect Fink’s early phenomenological reflections with his following attempt to develop a philosophical cosmology and anthropology. In the course of lectures here examined we can see the revival of the theme that considers philosophy – understood as a radical inquiring, open to the world and at the same time to the self of the human being – the primary place of freedom. In connection with this theme Fink theorizes a concept of freedom that does not confine freedom to a subjective polar opposite to nature, but focuses on the exposure of the human being to the world. Fink, indeed, starts a discussion on the question of freedom through a comparison between two opposite patterns of thought, namely the philosophies of Kant and Nietzsche, read with a perspective that puts both these philosophies in contrast to the absolutization of subjectivity in the systems of German idealism.
Nielsen Cathrin, Schnell Alexander (2022) Eugen Fink und die Phänomenologie. Phänomenologische Forschungen – Neue Folge 2022 (2).
Lazzari Riccardo (2022) „Eugen Fink und das Thema des Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit“. Phänomenologische Forschungen – Neue Folge 2022 (2), 57–74.